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Abstract
Financial incentives for service providers are becoming a common strategy to improve ser-
vice delivery. However, this strategy will only work if demand for the service responds as
expected. Using a field experiment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that intro-
ducing a performance-based financing mechanism in the health sector has counterproductive
effects because demand is non-standard: despite reduced prices and eased access, demand for
health decreased, child health deteriorated, workers’ revenue dropped. Ironically, expected per-
verse effects of incentives on worker behavior were not realized: incentives led to more effort
from health workers on rewarded activities without deterring effort on non-rewarded activities,
nor inducing significant score manipulation or free-riding. We also find a decline in worker mo-
tivation following the removal of the incentives, below what it would have been in the absence of
exposure to the incentives. Management tools used in for-profit sectors are thus inappropriate
in non-profit sectors such as health where user and worker rationalities are specific.
JEL Codes: H51, I18, 012
1 Introduction
Long-standing concerns about the cost, accessibility and quality of health and education services
have raised a growing interest in financial incentives for service providers, in particular health work-
ers and teachers. It is a central idea in economics that incentives encourage effort and performance
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in the context of a classic agency problem: to produce a desired outcome, a principal entity provides
a reward conditional on the agent achieving a pre-determined performance. The reward should re-
inforce agents’ willingness to achieve the rewarded actions (motivational crowd-in effect), and the
broad empirical literature on incentives in for-profit organizations shows that it is often the case
(Lazear, 2000; Bandiera et al. 2007; Bandiera et al. 2013). However, we lack empirical evidence
that the success of financial incentives can extend to non-profit sectors where both workers and
clients are specific in terms of motives and rationality. This paper shows that the general positive
effects of financial incentives in for-profit sectors cannot be extended to non-profit sectors where
demand can respond negatively to price reduction and be inelastic to worker effort to ease service
access.
Performance-based financing is a mechanism by which health facilities are, at least partially,
funded by the government on the basis of their production of a pre-determined output. It is a
team incentive scheme where performance is measured at the facility level. Performance-based
financing (PBF) models have been implemented in many developed and developing countries (see
Figure 1 for the implementation of PBF in subsaharian Africa) using various performance criteria.
Most models use volume of service provision (number of patients) for some pre-determined health
services as their performance criteria, often combined with a measure of service quality. In this
paper, we study a PBF model targeting an output -the number of patients, rather than an input (e.g.
daily attendance or technical quality1). The system pushes health workers to develop appropriate
strategies and invest in the appropriate inputs to increase the output. Many different obstacles
can hinder the demand for health services: prices, information, service quality, or behavioral issues.
Since local health workers should be in a better position than the central government to identify
the relevant obstacles in a specific area, PBF is a contract that decentralizes the task of finding the
appropriate strategies to increase health service uptake.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on improving health service delivery.
First, even though performance-based financing schemes have become very popular in the health
sector in both developed and developing countries, the scientific evidence on their impact remains
thin. This paper constitutes the first study using the random assignment of a large number of health
areas to estimate the effects of a performance-based mechanism as a way to allocate governmental
1Two studies provide evidence that rewards contingent on a specific input (respectively attendance and service
quality) do motivate health workers to provide more of this input (at least in the short run), but did not lead to any
increase in health service utilization (the output) (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; Peabody et al., 2011).
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resources. Second, this paper provides a deeper understanding of the behavioral effects of financial
incentives, using detailed data on worker responses, strategies and motivation, which is a novelty
in the empirical literature on performance-based financing. We build on the psychological and
theoretical literature to test the potential adverse behavioral effects of financial incentives: (i) that
incentives may be negative motivational reinforcers (motivational crowd-out effect) (Lepper et al.
(1973), Deci (1975), Deci and Ryan (1985), Benabou and Tirole 2003, Benabou and Tirole 2006,
Gneezy et al. 2011); (ii) that agents may concentrate their effort on the actions attached to the
reward at the expense of other actions that might be important in producing the ultimate output
(multitasking problem) (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1991); (iii) that PBF may induce a reduction in
effort due to free-riding problems since rewards are collective and not individual (free-riding effect)
(Bandiera et al. (2013); (iv) and that incentivized agents may manipulate performance measures
in order to obtain more of the reward. We show that in the context of the health sector in DRC,
none of these adverse behavioral effects happen. Third, we provide evidence of a new mechanism
that explains why financial incentives may be counterproductive in non-profit sectors: we show
that demand for health services decreases with price and does not respond to eased access. Health
worker strategies to increase demand, although sensible, failed or even backfired.
This paper uses data from an experiment conducted in the Haut-Katanga district of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2009 and 2013 to compare the effect of a PBF approach
to that of a fixed payment approach. The 96 health areas of the Haut-Katanga district were ran-
domly assigned to performance-based or fixed governemental payments, while ensuring that the
same amount of resources was allocated to each group to neutralize any ressource effect. All of
the 152 public, private or religious health facilities in these health areas participated in the exper-
iment. In this study, the PBF mechanism was based on relative incentives: a number of points
was attributed to each facility based on the number of patients for some pre-determined services
at this facility relative to all other PBF-group facilities. Unannounced visits to the facilities were
performed in July, August and September 2012 in order to measure worker attendance, and a final
independent survey was administered a few months after the payments had been withdrawn to
collect data on (i) the supply and price of health services, (ii) health workers’ work-related stress
and motivation, (iii) service utilization, and (iv) the population health status during and after the
PBF implementation. The analysis distinguishes targeted and non-targeted services in order to test
the potential disruptive effect of incentives on non-targeted services. It is important to note that
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there are many different PBF models (see Miller and Barbiaz (2013) for a review) and that the
performance criteria used in DRC were kept simple, based on the number of patients and not on
service quality, so that it could be feasibly implemented in the difficult conditions of this country.
The results will thus be discussed in light of this particular PBF approach, although we refer to it
in the rest of the paper as “PBF” for simplicity.
This study finds that the introduction of the financial incentives in the PBF group led to concrete
changes in health workers’ behavior. Health workers made greater effort to attract patients: (1)
they were more present in facilities; (2) they significantly reduced fees for targeted services; (3) they
organized more preventive health sessions at facilities; (4) they conducted more community-based
outreach activities to sensitize the population about the services offered by the facility. Overall, the
financial incentives thus induced an intensification of effort to increase utilization of targeted health
services. This result contrasts with the finding of a study in Zambia in which financial incentives
did not induce more effort by hairdressers to sell condoms (Ashraf et al. 2014). Equally important,
we find that the increased effort invested in the targeted services did not happen at the expense
of the effort invested in the non-targeted services. Also, the reward did not induce significant
score manipulation and did not have a negative effect on service quality. Finally, we did not find
evidence that the collective nature of the incentive induced significant free-riding. Overall, none
of the perverse behavioral effects that could be anticipated with this performance-based financing
scheme were realized.
However, the increased effort by the health workers led to a decrease in utilization of health
services by the population. We find evidence that the demand for health services responded nega-
tively to price reduction, and did not respond to the effort to ease access to health services. As a
consequence, there was less total revenue in these facilities (42% less), even though the two groups
received the same subsidy payment level from the government. Consequently, the financial incentive
payment mechanism resulted in a 34% reduction in staff revenues, as well as a 12% reduction in
health worker job satisfaction. Even more critical, we find a small deterioration in newborn and
child health outcomes. The negative response of demand for health to price reduction suggests that
prices signal service quality and efficiency. In a context where people are not informed about the
benefits of using health services, they might have interpreted lower prices as lower benefits. The
lack of response to greater attendance and supply for health services indicates that the population
needs more than logistical information, which is also consistent with the idea that a better under-
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standing of health service benefits is required. These findings echoe the argument by Glucksberg
(1962) and Ariely et al. (2009) that increased motivation may not lead to increased performance
when the task is difficult and requires innovative and creative thinking and, although in a different
context, the view of Loevinsohn and Harding (2005) suggesting that providers may not possess
adequate ability to innovate and change health-seeking behavior if they lack human capital. It is
crucial to think about the barriers that impede the increase in demand for health services and were
not addressed in the strategies implemented by the incentivized health workers, such as the lack
of awareness of the benefit of health care services, or perhaps the general uncertainty about the
quality of care. Qualitative evidence from the field indicates that people might interpret prices as
signals for service utility, which would explain why price elasticity of demand is positive. The fact
that the health workers developed counterproductive actions to stimulate the demand may suggest
that health workers are not good entrepreneurs, or that their task was too difficult in a context
where demand is non-standard.
Finally, an important result is that staff attendance, which was found to be higher in the
incentivized health facilities than in the fixed payment facilities when the incentives were in place,
was found to be lower three months after the incentives were withdrawn. Also, the previously
incentivized health workers were found to attach more importance to job material benefits relative
to non-material benefits. We show that these effects are not attributable to the decrease in worker
income, suggesting that incentive-based payments deterred some of staff intrinsic motivation.
Several empirical studies advocate that performance-based financing improves accountability,
efficiency, quality and quantity of service delivery (see Loevinsohn and Harding (2005) and Eichler
and Levine (2009) for an overview). However, the presence of confounding factors2 and the fact
that it is often not possible to isolate the effects of financial incentives from other elements3 make
the question of the impact of PBF largely unanswered (Christianson et al. 2008; Eldridge and
Palmer 2009; Oxman and Fretheim 2009). Olken et al. (2014) report on a field experiment using
a PBF mechanism to improve the efficacy of a grant program to village committees in Indonesia.
The PBF mechanism was applied to village committees rather than directly to health workers, so
2Until 2011, the studies of the impact of PBF did not use credible comparison groups: they compare very small
groups (generally 2-3 districts) which were not randomly assigned to the different treatments (Soeters, 2011; Rusa et
al., 2009; Soeters et al., 2005; Eicher et al., 2007; Soeters and Griffths, 2003; Forsberg, 2001), or the situation before
and after the introduction of PBF (Sondorp et al., 2008; Eicher et al., 2007; Meessen et al., 2007).
3PBF has commonly been a part of a package that may include increased funding, technical support, training,
changes in management, and new information systems. In most studies, the level of resources allocated to the health
facilities in different treatments is not similar, as well as the level of technical supervision and information system.
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this program tested monitoring of health workers by incentivized community members but not the
direct effect of incentives to health workers. The incentive led to an increase in health workers’
attendance, better health outcomes, and an absence of negative spillovers on untargeted outcomes.
Basinga et al. (2011) conducted a quasi-experimental study on the effect of PBF that is the closest
to our study. The study took place in Rwanda using a difference-in-difference strategy in order to
control for potential selection effects4. It finds that PBF is an efficient way to increase utilization of
some of the targeted services as well as worker productivity, and to improve some targeted health
outcomes (Basinga et al. 2011; De Walque et al. 2013; Gertler and Vermeesch 2013). However, the
study does not examine the effects of the incentive on the provision of non-targeted services, nor
does it provide evidence on health worker strategies to increase their performance. The literature
on the effect of PBF using clean identification is thus very limited, and the lack of information on
precise worker responses and strategies still needs to be addressed5 (Miller and Babiarz, 2013).
There are key policy implications of our findings for governments considering performance-based
mechanisms as a way to allocate public resources to the health sector. First, financial incentives may
increase health worker motivation overall without reducing service quality or non-rewarded services,
nor inducing score manipulation or free-riding. However, there are two considerations. First,
financial incentives might reduce the intrinsic component of health worker motivation. Second, our
results suggest that contingent rewards might not be appropriate when the task requires complex
strategies because users do not respond as expected. The translation of motivation into performance
may be better in contexts where demand is classic and the rewarded task is easy. To the best of
our knowlegde, this paper is one of the first to show that incentives can decrease performances in
service delivery, along with the equally new paper of Rasul and Rogger (2014). In our paper, the
reason is not that incentives induce perverse effects on service supply, but that demand for health
services is inelastic to eased access and decreases with price.
4166 facilities were grouped into 8 pairs and one side of each pair was randomly assigned to pay-for-performance
funding, while the other side continued with the traditional input-based funding until 23 months after study baseline.
The paper uses a difference-in-difference strategy in order to control for potential selection effects since the number
of units of randomization was very small and some post-randomization reassignment of some districts happened
because of administrative boundaries’ reorganization.
5The literature is not very developed in the context of high income countries either, and identification issues also
limit the scope of many studies. One recent study on the effect of pay-for-performance mechanism is Mullen, Franck
and Rosenthal (2010), which uses a difference-in-difference strategy on US data and show that pay-for-performance
targeted on service quality did not lead to any major improvement in quality of targeted services, nor notable effect
on the quality of non-targeted services. Note that pay-for-performance in high income countries tends to reward
quality measures instead of service volume. This might be because the policy concern is more about service quality
than about service utilization in rich countries relative to poor countries. See Stabile and Thomson (2014) for a
review.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical back-
ground. Section 3 presents the context in which the experiment was set up and the experimental
design. Section 4 examines the data and econometric approach. Section 5 presents the effects of
PBF compared to a fixed payment approach, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section, we show that reasonable assumptions on workers’ behavior, different from infor-
mational and reputational effects, can produce predictions consistent with the evidence found in
the literature that extrinsic rewards may backfire (Glucksberg (1962), Deci (1971), Lepper et al.
(1973), Deci and Ryan (1985), Kohn (1993), Ariely et al. (2009), among others).
Let’s consider that an agent engages in a certain task if and only if his interest in the activity
is larger than the cost of undertaking the activity c. If the agent succeeds in producing the output,
his benefit in the activity is two-fold: the intrinsic value that the agent attributes to the output,
V , and a contingent reward b. If he does not succeed the benefit is zero, and the probability that
he succeeds if he undertakes the activity is his ability θ. His utility of engaging in the activity is
thus given by U = θ(V + b)− c. Holding everything else equal, the reward b therefore increases the
probability that the agent engages in the activity.
Benabou and Tirole’s (2003) framework provides an explanation of why rewards may be coun-
terproductive in the presence of information assymmetries: rewards from a knowledgeable principal
may inform a more ignorant agent about (i) the difficulty of the task c, (ii) his ability to succeed
in the task θ, or (iii) the intrinsic value of the task V 6. These informational effects of rewards have
a negative impact on the agent’s utility which might be large enough to offset the positive impact
of θb. Moreover, the permanent nature of informational effect makes the effect on motivation last
after incentives have been withdrawn. Benabou and Tirole (2006) adds another explanation of why
extrinsic rewards might crowd out agent’s effort during the period when incentives are in place:
an agent concerned by social reputation or self-respect concerns might want to reduce his effort in
response to the introduction of extrinsic rewards in order to signal his intrinsic motives. As Gneezy
et al. (2011) summarizes, economists think about the effects of incentives on behavior in terms of
information and signaling.
6Individuals may have imperfect memory why they engaged in the task. Note that in this case there is no need
for the principal to have information that the agent does not have. It is just information that the agent had and lost.
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However, the literature suggests that informational and reputational effects are unlikely to drive
all situations where rewards backfire. For instance in Deci (1971), Zeevi (1971) or Lepper et al.
(1973), students who are offered external rewards for performing tasks such as solving a series of
puzzles or art activity are less likely to engage in these tasks after the external reward has been
withdrawn. The authors do not find evidence that students feel less able to perform or that they
find the task more difficult. The authors find that students express less interest in the task itelf.
The explanation through information asymmetries does not fit well with these observations because
it seems unlikely that the students learned much about the difficulty of the puzzles, or their ability
to perform the puzzles, or the intrinsic value of solving puzzles in the process. In such contexts
where information assymmetries seem small or non-existent, the reason for a decrease in motivation
after the reward is withdrawn should be found elsewhere. In fact, the authors point to the fact
that the introduction of extrinsic motives causes a shift in attention from the value that the agent
attributes to the output V in favor of the external benefit b. Actions perceived as “ends” in the
absence of external motives tend to become “means” when external rewards are introduced (Lepper
et al. 1982). Deci and Ryan (1985) argues that rewards change the locus of control from internal to
external and make agents bored, alienated and reactive rather than proactive. Kohn (1993) notes
that rewards make people less enthusiastic about their behaviour. Overall, what psychologists call
the “overjustification effect” is compatible with situations where principals and agents have similar
information about agent’s ability or the difficulty and intrinsic value of the task to start with, but
agents pay less attention to the intrinsic value of the task after they were offered extrinsic rewards.
We thus propose (and test in our empirical analysis) an alternative habit-forming based theory
of motivation by introducing: (i) a parameterα reflecting the attention paid to the extrinsic benefit
from the task b (the reward), and (ii) a parameterβ reflecting the attention paid to its intrinsic value
V . The total motivation is given by: U = θ(βV +αb)− c where α and β reflect weights attached to
extrinsic versus intrinsic motives in agent’s utility. Our framework is based on two key assumptions:
(1) First, β = f(α) with f
′
(.) ≤ 0, which represents the idea that people have limited attention in
the sense that more attention paid to extrinsic motives can only decrease attention paid to intrinsic
ones, or do nothing. (2) Second, attention is prone to habit-forming: as soon as attention is drawn
to a motive, it remains permanently because people do not forget. For example, an awareness
campaign that would draw agent’s attention to the intrinsic value of the task would shift β from 0
to a positive value. Similarly, the introduction of a financial remuneration for succeeding at the task
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would shift α from 0 to a positive value. Then the levels of intrinsic valueV and extrinsic benefitb
are likely to vary over time depending on new information, experience, principal’s decisions etc., but
agent’s attention paid on intrinsic and extrinsic motives cannot disappear. Attention parameters
α and β evolve over time only through the relationship β = f(α) in contexts where attention is
limited (f non constant).
Under this framework, post-reward motivation is smaller than pre-reward if and only if f
′
< 0.
The mechanism is as follows:
Before Exposure to Extrinsic Rewards The agent has never received any extrinsic reward for
engaging in the task (b = 0), and therefore he does not pay attention to extrinsic motives (α = 0).
The utility of engaging in the activity is U0 = θf(0)V − c.
During Exposure to Extrinsic Rewards The principal introduces an extrinsic reward b > 0,
and the agent pays a level of attention α > 0 to the reward. The utility of engaging into the activity
is now U1 = θ(f(α)V +αb)−c. Since α > 0, f(α) < f(0) and U1 can be both smaller or larger than
U0 depending on the size of the increase in motivation due to the new extrinsic reward αb relative
to the loss in motivation due to the shift of attention paid to intrinsic motives (f(0) − f(α))V .
Typically small rewards in contexts where intrinsic motives are large would decrease the total
motivation, while large rewards in contexts where intrinsic motives are small would increase the
total motivation.
After Exposure to Extrinsic Rewards The principal stops providing the agent with rewards
(b is back to 0). However, attention parameters remain the same because attention is prone to
habit-forming, and the utility of engaging in the activity is now: U2 = θf(α)V − c. U2 is smaller
than U1 if and only if α > 0, meaning exposure to extrinsic reward in the previous period effectively
drew agent’s attention on extrinsic motives. Moreover, U2 is smaller than U0 if and only if f
′
< 0,
meaning agent’s attention is limited.
In a context of unlimited attention (f
′ ≡ 0), the introduction of an extrinsic reward would
attract some new attention from the agent without decreasing pre-existing attention paid to the
intrinsic value of the task V . After the extrinsic reward is withdrawn, pre-existing attention paid
to the intrinsic valueV would remain intact and motivation would be back at its pre-reward level,
without any detrimental effect on later motivation.
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In the empirical part of the paper, we test this theoretical framework by eliciting the relative
size of α and β and comparing agents who have been exposed to extrinsic reward (the performance-
based financing system) and people who have not. A testable prediction is that α should be larger
and β smaller among the former than the latter. We also provide evidence on the comparison
between the different utilities of engaging into the activityU0, U1 and U2.
Finally, rewards may backfire not because of reduced motivation, but because increased moti-
vation is accompanied by reduced performance. There are two main explanations for the reduced
performance. One is the multitask interpretation proposed in Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1991) where
agents focus on the rewarded actions at the expense of other actions that might be necessary to
perform well, which we also refer to as a substitution effect7. Second, Glucksberg (1962) and Ariely
et al. (2009) observe that people who are offered a reward for performing at some tasks perform
better at simple tasks but worse at tasks calling for cognitive skills, indicating that rewards gener-
ate negative stress limiting one’s creative thinking (Baumeister, 1984). In this case, lower ability is
associated with larger rewards (θ′(b) < 0) not because the agent infers that his ability is lower than
expected, but because larger rewards constitute larger stakes and larger stress which narrows the
mind and reduces the ability to perform (Kamenica, 2012). McGraw and McCullers (1979) explains
that reward leads to underachievement when the task requires open-minded thinking because the
focus of attention limits one’s capacity to draw unusual connections between elements. Under neg-
ative stress, the agent initially provides more effort and yet produces a smaller output8. In other
words, the utilityU is larger but a change in the content of the effort makes it less productive. One
example would be a student whose motivation in passing her exam gets larger due to the promise of
a gift conditional on passing and who would spend hours reading her lessons without being able to
learn because her mind would be distracted. In the context of health workers exposed to financial
rewards, the phenomena may show itself through motivated but stressed out workers who would be
more tense, less staid with patients, or who would decrease time spent with the patients in order
to consult more of them.
All in all, the theory thus leaves room for both positive and negative effects of financial incentives
on both workers’ effort and performance, making the question empirical in essence.
7For instance, increased use of prenatal visits might not lead to a reduction in child mortality if mothers do fewer
postnatal visits
8After some periods, the agent may observe that her effort is de facto not as much productive as expected as
adjust her effort accordingly.
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3 Experimental Set-Up
3.1 Background on Health in DRC and Haut-Katanga
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the second largest country in Africa by area, with the
fourth largest population at 66 million (World Bank, 2012). It is also among the poorest countries
in the world: the country is ranked second from the bottom of the Human Development Index (186
out of 187 in 2012) (UNDP, 2012), with an estimated per capita income of US$ 220 (current) in 2012
(World Bank, 2012). Impoverished by decades of war, instability and bad governance, DRC is not
on track to reach the health-related Millenium Development Goals. Since the democratic elections
in 2006, the country has started a slow reconstruction phase and a decentralization process, with
the election of provincial governments, including provincial ministers of health. Performance-based
Financing (PBF) is a strategy for improving health outcomes among the population which has been
developed and implemented to promote effective service delivery.
The district of Haut-Katanga entails 1.26 million people in the province of Katanga in the south-
eastern corner of the DRC. From September to November 2009, a survey was conducted to better
understand the health situation in Haut-Katanga by providing a description of the functioning of
the health facilities as well as the characteristics and behavior of the health workers, patients and
households in the district. The survey sample entailed 152 health facilities (5% referral centers, 71%
health centers and 24% health posts)9. This survey indicated that the initial situation of the health
facilities in Haut-Katanga was worrying primarily because of the poor quality of health services
rather than the coverage for basic health services. In regards to health services coverage, 87% of
patients lived 10km or less from facilities, 70% spent less than one hour to travel to the facility,
and there was one health worker for every 1860 individuals10.
However, the poor quality of infrastructure was striking: only one out of four facilities had
access to a water tap or electricity. The majority of facilities had only low-cost basic equipment.
Most health workers were not public agents: one worker out of four did not receive any fixed wage
from the government. Worker payment thus came from facility revenue, mainly user fees and drug
sales, but also public grants and -sometimes- funds from NGOs and private donors. Relatedly,
health workers were often engaged in multiple activities: the typical health worker earned 61%
of his income from the health facility, while 39% from other jobs and/or agricultural production.
9161 health facilities were recognized as part of the government health system in the district, among which 5
hospitals were excluded from the study and 4 health centers could not be reached.
10The ministry of health considers that there should be at least one health worker for every 1500 individuals.
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However, health workers spent 52 hours per week working in the health facility. They received 35
patients the week before the survey equating approximately 7 patients per working day each which
means thathealth workers were not overworked and likely spent some time waiting for patients to
come. Patients reported quite short consultation time (16 minutes on average), and twice as much
waiting time before the consultation (30 minutes on average)11. 56% of patients had to pay a fee
for the service, although the median fee for a visit was quite low 800FC (0.88$).
In this survey, the health status of the population was found to be poor: 25% of the sample
had been sick in the last four weeks, with malaria and diarrhea being the most prevalent diseases.
Concerning maternal health, 31% of births in the last 12 months were not attended in a formal
health facility. Mothers used more prenatal than postnatal health services: 76% of women pregnant
in the last 12 months had at least one prenatal visit while only 10% attended a postnatal visit.
However, according to women’s recall, only a third of prenatal visits included the minimum tests.
Despite frequent immunization campaigns, only 13% of children under 5 years-old were able to
present an immunization card (although based on mothers’ declaration a majority of children got
immunized at least once). Finally, we found low exposure to prevention campaigns other than
immunization, with around two thirds of the households never exposed to any HIV prevention,
child nutrition, or maternal health campaign.
3.2 Experimental Design
Payment Calculation
In the Haut-Katanga district, the 96 health areas (totalizing 152 health facilities) were randomly
assigned to one of two payment systems. In the fixed payment group, the amount allocated to each
facility was calculated based on the staff in the facility: a list of eligible workers was established at
the beginning of the pilot by the Ministry of Health. Each worker was entitled to a given amount of
governmental payment depending on his grade and experience. In the performance-based payment
group, payments were made based on declaration of service volumes by facilities. The targeted
services included seven services at the primary care level (outpatient first curative consultations,
prenatal consultations, deliveries, obstetric referral, children completely vaccinated, tetanus toxoid
vaccination, and family planning consultations) and three additional services at the secondary care
level (C-section, blood transfusion, and obstetric referrals to hospitals). Relative prices for each
11This survey did not allow for assessing the technical quality of medical procedures.
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service are presented in Appendix Table 1.
Formally, payments to health facilities can be written as:
Pi,m = αi + βmQi,m
where Pi,m is the payment to facility i in month m, αi represents a fixed component, Qi,m is the
vector of targeted service quantities provided by facility i in month m, and βm is the vector of prices
that the government attach to each targeted service in month m. The PBF group was characterized
by a pure performance-based mechanism (αi = 0 and βm > 0), whereas the comparison payment
group had a pure fixed payment (αi > 0 and βm = 0). In order to ensure neutrality in the level of
funds received by both groups and to isolate the incentive effect from the resource effect, the total
budget allocated to health facilities in the PBF group was the same as the total budget allocated








where n is the number of health facilities in the PBF and in the fixed-payment group. Hence,
noting Qm the average service provision in the PBF group in month m and α the average payment
in the fixed payment group:
α = βmQm
Since the budget of the health provincial authorities was fixed and could not vary every month
depending on the average service provision in the PBF group, α was fixed and βm was adjusted
accordingly at α
Qm
12. Although relative prices attached to the targeted services were constant (see
Appendix Table 1), absolute prices and facility payments were thus determined by the quantity of
services provided by the facility relative to the quantity of services provided by the other incentivized
health facilities. As discussed in Bandiera et al. (2005), relative incentives might yield lower effort
from the health workers than piece rates because effort imposes a negative externality on others,
in particular when others are friends13. The budget used in this experiment estimated at $0.43
per capita per year (average monthly facility payments were $550 and the average catchment area
12The other way to equalize the two total budgets is to fix βm = β and adjust α accordingly at βQm. This technique
was used in the Rwanda experiment where the governmental budget could increase according to the average service
provision in the incentivized group.
13In the context of this PBF program, we do not have measures of interpersonnal connections between workers of
different health facilities. However, health facilities are generally distant one from another and it seems unlikely that
health workers from different health facilities live in the same neighborhood and are close friends.
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population was 12,900)14. The average monthly payment by facility from June 2010 and September
2012 did not differ in the fixed payment and in the PBF group. This confirms that the experimental
design was respected and that the study isolates the incentive effect from any resource effect.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the average monthly facility payment over the study period by
treatment status. Payments proved more disperse under PBF than uner fixed-payment, suggesting
heterogenous responses to the incentive with some health facilities getting less than under a fixed
payment mechanism and others getting more.
Performance Verification
Service volumes were measured using monthly reports submitted by facilities, in which the number
of patients for each targeted service was reported. These numbers were verified by public agents at
the beginning of the following month by comparing reported volumes with those found in health
facility registers15. Payments were calculated and paid as soon as the register verification was done,
generally during the following month.The same payment lag applied to the fixed payment group
since all payments happened at the same time. Subsequent verification of the information noted in
the registers was also conducted: a random sample of 30 patients16 from the registers were selected
and visited by independent associations to check the accuracy of the information reported17. A
system of retroactive financial sanctions was integrated in order to reduce providers’ incentives to
submit fraudulent reports and register phantom patients.
In reality, the community verification system proved weak: PBF facilities only received 3 com-
munity verifications on average throughout the experiment and there was no effective financial
sanction associated with being caught for fraudulent over-reporting. Specifically, the reductions
in payments were proportionally equal to the percentage of patients not being identified through
community verification. For example, if 18% of patients were not found through community ver-
ification, the facility would only receive a reduction of 18% in their corresponding payment and
14This is lower than in other contexts where output budgets range between $2 and $3 per capita per year.
15Register verification was also meant to take place in health facilities under the fixed payment mechanism since
the government wanted to improve the accountability of health facilities in general, not only as an element of PBF.
At endline, the average number of register verifications in the last 12 months is 7 in both in the PBF and in the
fixed-payment group (p-value of the test of equality of means in the two group = 0.48).
16The 30 patients were chosen such that each targeted service is present in the sample, but none of the non-targeted
services.
17Community verifications were meant to take place only in the PBF group as part of the financing mechanism.
However, we conducted community verifications in the fixed payment health facilities for impact evaluation purposes
(1 community verification by facility in the comparison group). The fixed payment health facilities had no incentive
to cheat on service volumes so the comparison of discrepancy rates between the PBF and the fixed payment groups
allow for differentiating cheating from natural -unavoidable- discrepancies due to the fact that some patients moved
or were absent at the time of the verification.
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no additional sanctions were enforced. Despite the weak verification process, we did not find any
significant difference in the propensity to report phantom patients in the registers: the average
proportion of missing patients was found to be 17% in the fixed payment group and 21% in the
PBF group. The difference was not statistically significant. However, the health workers in the
PBF group were significantly more likely to fill out consultation reports for their patients than in
the fixed payment group: in the endline survey, 94% of health workers declared that they fill out a
consultation report for each patient in the PBF group, whereas only 78% of health workers in the
fixed payment group. Since patients were reported in the register based on consultation reports,
service utilization was under-reported in the fixed-payment group. It is interesting to note that the
issue with administrative data is not that incentivized health workers inflate artifically the number
of patients, but rather that the non-incentivized workers under-report the number of patients as
they don’t have any financial benefit of reporting accurate service volumes. Overall, it is crucial
to rely on an independent source of information about service utilization for the impact evaluation
since administrative data does not give an accurate idea of service utilization in the fixed-payment
group.
Autonomy of Payment Allocation
The autonomy of payment allocation among facility staff in the PBF group led to a significantly
more egalitarian distribution of payments among workers. In the fixed payment group, 77% of
health workers received a share of the payment, whereas 93% of workers in the PBF group18.
PBF actually benefited non-technical workers (pharmacists, managers, secretaries, receptionists
and maintenance workers) who were not in the governmental payroll and therefore did not receive
a share of the fixed payment19. Consistently, the average last payment to health workers showed
less dispersion in the PBF group: the standard deviation was 36% lower in the PBF group than
in the fixed payment group and the difference is significant. This confirms the finding of a more
egalitarian distribution of the payment among workers in the PBF group.
18This information was collected at endline from the facility heads. The facility heads listed the workers in the
facility, indicated whether each of them received a share of the last payment, and the corresponding amount.
19Since the fixed payment is calculated based on the number and qualification of workers on the governmental
payroll, the workers typically receive the amount of money corresponding to their contribution to the fixed payment.
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Resulting Structure of Worker Motivation
We now link our theoretical framework and the actual context of this specific experiment. The task
workers engage into is attracting patients, and the output is the number of patients. The experiment
manipulates the structure of motivation by adding a contingent reward in worker utility of attracting
patients.
In the fixed payment group, worker utility of attracting patients is driven by the intrinsic value
they attribute to this task, as well as a contingent benefit coming from user fees. In fact, the more
health workers consult patients, the higher facility’s revenue from user fees, which constitutes a
large part of workers’ remuneration. Workers in this group thus already pay attention to extrinsic
motives through this benefit from user fees. Let’s denote (α0, f(α0)) the levels of attention paid
respectively on extrinsic and intrinsic motives, and F the level of worker remuneration from user
fees, in the fixed payment group. Using the parameters of our theoretical framework, workers’
utility of attracting patients in the fixed payment group is thus U0 = θ(f(α0)V + α0F )− c
In the PBF group, the difference is the introduction of a new contingent reward from the
government. Governmental payments play a role in the PBF group by increasing workers’ benefit
of engaging into attracting patients. Let’s denote (α1, f(α1)) the new levels of attention paid on
extrinsic and intrinsic motives resulting from the introduction of this new category of contingent
reward, and P the governmental payment. Workers’ utility of attracting patients in the PBF
group is thus U1 = θ(f(α1)V + α1(F + P )) − c. After government payments are withdrawn,
worker utility of attracting patients is unchanged in the fixed payment group, while it becomes
U2 = θ((f(α1)V + α1F )− c = U1 − θα1P in the PBF group.
In the rest of the paper, we will present evidence on the relative size of U0 and U1, U0 and U2,
as well as α0 and α1.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data Sources
Five sources of data are used for the impact evaluation.
Baseline Survey A survey was administered between September and November 2009. Only 85%
of health facilities involved in the experiment (129 out of 152) were interviewed in this survey. As
a result, we perform the balance checks on this subsample of our experimental sample.
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Administrative Data Administrative data are available every month from January 2010 to
December 2012 for all 152 health facilities. This data includes the number of targeted services
provided, the payment due to the health facility, the actual payment made to the health facility,
whether a performance verification occurred and related indicators (e.g., % missing patients and
consequent financial sanctions). We use this data to examine payments received by the facilities but
we do not rely on it to measure service provision and utilization since it can be both manipulated
and not evenly reported in the PBF and fixed payment groups as a consequence of the incentive.
Qualitative Data In April and June 2012, qualitative interviews were conducted in 31 health
facilities randomly selected in 4 out of the 8 health zones (Kafubu, Kipushi, Kasenga and Lukafu).
In each facility, one interview was done with the facility head and another one with a health worker
(on a voluntary basis). In total, 29 facility heads and 31 health workers were interviewed, all by the
same person. They were equally distributed between the PBF group and the fixed payment group.
Questions were all open and dealt with the perception of the payment (transparency, fairness,
understanding of the calculation), the general functioning of the health facility, recent changes that
might have occurred in the facility, and obstacles to improve the number of patients and the quality
of services.
Attendance Spot Checks Unannounced spotchecks were performed in July, August and Septem-
ber 2012 to collect data on worker attendance in the health facilities that is impervious to gaming.
Endline Survey A final survey was administered between December 2012 and February 2013,
four months after the PBF mechanism was withdrawn. The endline survey was administered in 87
out of the 96 health areas involved in the experiment. The rainy season and the insecurity created
by the Ma¨ı Ma¨ı insurgency made it impossible to reach the other 9 health areas. Attrition occurred
at the same rate in both groups, with 44 health areas in the PBF group and 43 in the fixed payment
group included.
The endline survey included four different questionnaires for facility heads, health workers,
patients straight out of consultation, and households living in the catchment area. Appendix Table
2 reports the endline sample size by questionnaire and treatment status. All facilities in the 87 health
areas that could be reached were interviewed, totalizing 123 health facilities. All the technical staff
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in each health facility was interviewed up to 10 persons20, totalizing 332 health workers. A sample
of 10 patients per facility was randomly selected for exit interviews, or the maximum available if
fewer are present, totalizing 1,014 patients. Finally, the household questionnaire was administered
to 1,708 households: 20 households were interviewed in each of the 87 health areas, among which
10 households randomly chosen in the population and 10 randomly chosen among the households
with a pregnancy in the last 12 months21. Appendix Table 3 shows basic descriptive statistics of
the endline sample.
4.2 Outcomes of Interest
Cost of Health Services Changes in user fees in the incentivized group could be a strategy to
increase utilization of targeted services and, therefore, increase payments by reducing the cost to
patients. The reverse effect may happen on non-targeted services, as a way to compensate for the
loss in revenue from targeted services, or discourage demand for non-targeted services.
User fees were collected from the facility heads at endline and from users in the last 12 months.
In order to compare fees declared by facility heads across the largest number of health facilities, we
used the fees of the most commonly offered services: curative consultations, birth delivery, prenatal
visits, postnatal visits, and preschool consultations. To improve statistical power to detect effects
that go in the same direction within a domain, we also present findings for a Fee Summary Index
that aggregates information over all these user fees (following Kling et al, 2007), as well as a Fee
Summary Index for targeted services (curative and prenatal consultations, and birth delivery) and
a Fee Summary Index for non-targeted services (postnatal and preschool consultations). We also
collected user fees from users in the last 12 months to examine price levels when payments were in
place. For preventive services, we present user fees reported by users in the last 12 months on the
one hand and users before September 2012 -when PBF was implemented- on the other hand. For
curative services, we were not able to apply the same strategy as we only asked about the last visit
20In the facilities staffing more than 10 health workers, 10 were randomly chosen from the list of all health workers
during the facility head interview. The health workers who were present the day when the interviewer visited the
health facility were interviewed on-site, whereas the others were visited at home. Only those health workers who
were out of the neighborhood at the time of the survey (because they were on vacation or because they temporarily
migrated) could not be interviewed.
21The selection of the 20 households was done as follows: four axes in the locality were randomly drawn from a
central point, then one household was visited every five houses on each axis. - On two axes, all households were
eligible and took the survey if it consented to (otherwise the next household was visited). After each interview, the
interviewer went five houses further and continued the selection until he could interview 5 household on each axis. -
On the two other axes, only households where a woman had been pregnant in the last 12 months were eligible. If the
household did not meet the criteria, then the next household was visited etc. until an eligible household was found.
After each interview, the interviewer went five houses further and continued the selection until he could interview 5
household on each axis.
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which mostly happened after September 2012.
Accessibility of Health Services The facility’s opening hours, the number of service varieties
offered, and the number and qualification of workers were collected from facility heads. To examine
access, patients and household members were also asked whether they could consult every time
they visited. Worker attendance (number of health workers present at the facility) and on-the-job
effort (number of health workers actually working) were collected from the unannounced spotchecks
done by independent research assistants22. Regular preventive sessions at the facility help service
utilization by giving greater opportunity to users to access preventive services. The number of
preventive sessions organized at the facility in the last 12 months was collected from facility heads.
Also, outreach activities in communities are made to inform the population about the preventive
sessions (topic, day and hour). The number of outreach activities in the community in the last 12
months was collected from health workers. Using the service related to each preventive session and
outreach activity, we can separate the number of activities related to targeted services (prenatal
care, immunization and family planing) from the number of activites related to non-targeted services
(postnatal care and HIV prevention).
Service Quality Service quality is primarily measured by technical quality. Consultation time
is considered as a component of service technical quality, although we consider compliance with
standard medical procedures as the main indicator. Compliance was assessed on patients imme-
diately following the consultation who consulted for illness: they were asked whether three basic
procedures were followed during the consultation (being weighted, examined and having his ten-
sion checked). Compliance was also assessed on women who gave birth in the last 12 months who
were asked about standard procedures applied during prenatal visits (weighing, stomach palpation,
tension check, stomach measure, HIV test, tetanus shot, blood test, urine analysis and information
on immunization schedule) and postnatal visits (stomach palpation, child weighing, child examina-
tion, child immunization and child immunization card). We also measure the proportion of patients
straight out of consultation who visited for illness whether they were prescribed drugs without being
examined, as well as the number of days women attended the facility after giving birth.
22Note that the interviewer reported the number of workers present and working without telling the facility heads
and the workers. The purpose of the visit was officially related to administrative matters and not attendance checks
in order to avoid any interference with worker behavior at a later point. Observational data on workers’ attendance
and on-the-job effort was anonymous and aggregated at the facility level.
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Finally, as complementary measures of service quality, we use the proportion of patients who
understood the diagnosis and prescriptions, as well as the proportion of patients and household
members who were satisfied with the visit.
Service Utilization First, we measure overall health service utilization by asking each household
member whether s/he visited a health facility in the last 12 months. Second, we disentangle
utilization of different services: curative services, child immunization, maternal health services and
family planning
For curative services we examine whether each household member has been sick and visited a
health facility in the last 12 months and, if so, the number of days with symptoms before s/he
visited.
For child immunization we look at whether each child aged 0-5 had at least one immunization
shot, the number of immunization shots reported in the immunization card (if any immunization
card), and whether a scar from TB immunization could be observed on the child’s shoulder. To
focus on immunization when payments were in place, we restrict the sample to children aged at
least 15 months at endline who were thus at least 1 year-old when payments were withdrawn.
For maternal health services we look at the number of prenatal visits to a health facility by
women who have been pregnant in the last 12 months, whether delivery (if any) was attended,
whether delivery (if any) was done with a c-section, and at the number postnatal visits to a health
facility. We focus on utilization when payments were in place by restricting the sample to women
who gave birth before September 2012. We also examine the total number of pre- and postnatal
visits including healers and den mothers out of health facilities in order to take into account potential
substitution effects between modern and traditional maternal health services.
Finally, for family planning we asked each woman aged 15-49 whether she was using a modern
contraceptive method: IUD, daily pill or implant. We also use whether each woman aged 15-49
has had a pregnancy in the last 12 months as a direct measure of utilization of family planning.
Pregnancy rate was calculated on the representative sample (randomly selected households) only
since, by construction, all women in the other sample have been pregnant in the last 12 months.
Population Health Status We use mortality rates as well as standard under-5 weight-for-age
and height-for-age z-scores to assess health status. Mortality rates are measured using the number
of persons who died in the last 12 months in the household, in particular the number of women
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who died for perinatal reasons, and the number of children under 5. We also use the proportion
of new-born in the last 12 months that are still alive. To focus on impact when payments were in
place, we show results restricting the sample to children born before September 2012.
Health Facility Revenue Depending on the price-elasticity and access-elasticity of the demand
for health services in the population, it is unclear what the effect of PBF on total resources in
health facilities is. We thus examine all sources of revenue at the facility level the month before
the endline survey as reported by facility heads, as well as workers’ payment the month before the
survey as reported by facility heads and health workers themselves.
The enumerators also observed the quantity and quality of equipment and infrastructure during
their visit, which reflect both total revenue and management decisions made at the facility level. We
constructed three indices, each index being the first component of a principal component analysis.
The quality index is based on direct observation by the enumerator when s/he arrived at the facility
for the endline survey of twelve items: building quality, waiting room, consultation room, lavabo,
soap, clean towels, bathrooms, sterilization material, permanent display of user fees and drugs’ costs,
use of an examination table and ordinogram. The infrastructure index includes six items: phone
ownership, motorized transportation mean ownership, access to clean water, toilet and electricity,
and hard roof. Finally, the equipment index includes the quantity of fifteen types of medical
equipment owned by the health facility: generator, sterilizer, tensiometer, stethoscope, baby-scales,
weighing scale, height gauge, microscope, gynecological examination table, fridge, delivery boxes,
fuel, kerosene, bed and solar panel.
Worker well-being and motivation To measure workers’ well-being and motivation we mea-
sured their job satisfaction, stress, anxiety and conflicts within the facility. We also looked at
free-riding behavior and at the nature of worker’s motivation.
We measure job satisfaction by asking at which level the worker would place his job satisfaction
on a scale from 0 to 10. We measure stress by asking the workers whether they find their workload
heavy, report too much work, or felt tired in the last 7 days (a summary index of these three com-
ponents reflecting stress, the “subjective workload index”, is also presented). We measure anxiety
by asking the workers whether they worry about job remuneration because of (i) its volatility, or
(ii) its level; we also ask whether workers feel in competition with other health facilities. Finally,
we measure conflicts by asking the workers whether the payment allocation was a source of conflict
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within the facility, and at which level the worker would place conflicts among workers on a scale
from 0 to 10.
Since free-riding is a concern when incentives are collective, we present some statistics on the
distribution of effort within the facility using the number of outreach activities for targeted services
in the last 12 months per agent. First, we show the proportion of agents who did not do any
outreach activities in order to assess whether some workers changed their effort on the extensive
margin. Second, we present the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles among agents who did some
outreach activities to assess whether workers changed their effort on the intensive margin, and
where. Finally, for facilities with at least two agents, we present the standard deviation of the
number of outreach activities per agent at the facility level to test whether the incentives changed
the dispersion of effort among workers, and not simply induced a homogenous translation.
The effect of financial incentives on the nature of worker motivation is measured using worker
attendance after the payments were withdrawn on the one hand, and worker motive elicitation on
the other hand. At the time of the endline survey, workers are no longer incentivized in the PBF
group so the incentive structure does no longer differ between the two groups: workers’ behavior is
driven by intrinsic motivation (perceived value of the job) and extrinsic motives (job remuneration).
Any difference in worker behavior therefore reflects persistent effects of PBF on either intrinsic
motivation, or job remuneration. Staff attendance provides a measure of workers’ total motivation
(intrinsic plus extrinsic). We also elicit workers’ motives: workers were asked about the main
advantage of their occupation, then about the main disadvantage. These questions were open in
order not to induce any type of response and capture the most salient motives, which are those that
come at the top of their mind. We classified the responses into seven categories of advantages (social
recognition, remuneration, material comfort, care about others’ health and life, power, interest in
the activity) and six categories of disadvantages (lack of social recognition, low remuneration, low
material comfort, responsibility over others’ life, too much pressure and responsibility, risk of being
sick due to the contact with patients). We calculate the proportion of workers who mention either
remuneration or material comfort as the main advantage, or low remuneration or low material
comfort as the main disadvantage. We use this proportion as a measure of the relative importance
of extrinsic versus intrinsic motives in workers’ total motivation.
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4.3 Empirical Strategy
Validation of the Experimental Protocol The internal validity of the impact evaluation relies
on the comparability of the fixed payment and the PBF groups as observed at endline. With a
large number of units of randomization, the law of large numbers insures that the characteristics
in both groups are balanced. Here randomization was done on 96 health areas and it is preferable
to check out whether the pre-program characteristics of the fixed payment and the PBF groups are
similar.
This comparison was done using the 2009 survey administered to health facilities, health workers,
and randomly chosen households in the catchment area. As explained earlier, only 85% of health
facilities involved in the experiment took the 2009 survey. As a result, 129 out of the 152 pilot
health facilities can be observed to check how characteristics were initially balanced between the
fixed payment and the PBF groups. Most initial characteristics are balanced, although the urban
health facilities (17% of the sample) were not equally distributed in the PBF and fixed payment
groups: they represent 12% of the PBF health facilities while 23% of the fixed payments ones.
Since the urban health facilities, staff, patients and households are likely to differ from the rural
ones, Appendix Table 4 presents the means of observables collected in 2009 in the PBF and fixed
payment groups as well as t-tests for the following null hypothesis: the difference is zero controlling
for a dummy indicating whether the unit of observation is located in a urban area. 2 differences
in means are significant at the 10% level out of 57 tests, which is consistent with what would be
expected with random sampling variations.We are therefore confident that differences in outcomes
at endline between the two groups are not driven by initial conditions as long as we control for
urban location.
Estimation Strategy For each outcome of interest, we show the estimation results of an equation
of the form:
Yi = α+ βPBFi +X
′
iγ + εi
Where PBF is a dummy for being in the PBF group. Because the treatment was randomly
assigned, it is in expectation uncorrelated with the error term and can therefore be estimated
through OLS. Coefficient β estimates the average local effect of PBF and is presented in the third
column of our result tables after the unit and number of observations We show the p-value for a
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test that this coefficient is equal to zero in the fourth column of the result tables.
The unit of observation i varies: it stands either for a health area, a health facility, a health
worker, a patient straight out of consultation, a household, or a household member. Following
the results of the balance checks discussed above, we control for a dummy indicating whether the
facility is urban. To improve the precision of the estimation of the average treatment effect, we also
use a small set of controls Xi which varies according to the unit of observation i: At the health area
level, it includes a dummy variables for the health zone (the Haut-Katanga province entails eight
health zones) and whether the majority of health facilities in a specific geographic area are religious.
At the health facility level, it includes dummies indicating the health zone, and whether the health
facility is religious. At the health worker level it also includes dummies indicating that the health
worker is a female, a doctor, a nurse, as well as the age and number of years of experience of the
health worker. At the patient level it includes a dummy indicating that the patient is a female,
the age of the patient, and the reason for the visit. At the household level, it includes the sex
and age of the household member, and for women a dummy indicating that the woman is literate.
The results are robust whether or not these controls are included in the regressions. We favor the
results controlling for these characteristics since it improves the precision of the estimates. Finally,
we clustered error terms at the health area level to take into account potential correlation between
units in the same assignment unit.
5 Results
5.1 Prices of Health Services
Table 1 presents the effects of PBF on user fees and drug prices. We find consistent evidence that
PBF induced a reduction in user fees for some targeted services.
Based on the information collected from facility heads, the mean Summary Fee Index is not
statistically different between both groups but looking at targeted services only it is significantly
lower in the PBF group : the mean Summary Fee Index for targeted services in the PBF group is
.81 standard deviations below the mean in the fixed payment group (significant at the 10% level).
Figure 3 shows that PBF reduced the proportion of health facilities offering high fee levels, and we
see a higher concentration at low fee levels, suggesting that the decrease in prices mostly results
from the response of those health facilities which would offer high prices under a fixed payment
mechanism. In contrast, the mean Summary Fee Index for non-targeted services of the PBF group
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is 0.4 standard deviations below the mean of the fixed payment group, a difference which is not
statistically significant23. The detailed analysis of fees by service shows that the average fee is lower
in PBF facilities for all services, although the difference is significant only for prenatal visits: the
first prenatal visit costs 442 FC in the PBF group instead of 850 FC in the fixed-payment group
(a 48% decrease), and the second prenatal visit costs 51 FC in the PBF group and 132 FC in the
fixed-payment group (a 61% decrease).
The reduction in user fees is confirmed by users. Patients straight out of consultation who visited
for a curative consultation paid 26% less for the consultation and 49% less for the drugs in the PBF
health facilities than in the fixed payment facilities (these differences are significant respectively
at the 5% and 1% levels). Moreover, women who have been pregnant in the last 12 months and
visited for a prenatal visit report a 21% lower fee in the PBF group than in the fixed-payment group
(significant at the 5% level). This effect is even more pronounced on pregnant women who visited
before September 2012 when PBF was in place: we find a 31% decrease in fees for prenatal visits
(significant at the 1% level). Overall, the data consistently suggest that PBF encouraged health
facilities to decrease the price of some targeted services, in this case curative care and prenatal care,
probably a strategy to attract more patients. Prices are also found to be rigid since they remained
lower in the PBF group even after PBF was withdrawn.
5.2 Accessibility of Health Services
Table 2 presents the effects of PBF on service accessibility: facility opening, service supply, staff
composition and attendance, as well as supply for preventive sessions at the facility and outreach
activities.
Health Facility Opening and Services Offered We find that PBF did not change the extent
to which health facilities are open: according to the facility heads, facilities open on average 30
days per month and 139 hours per week. Ninety-four percent of patients and 86% of households
report that they could consult every time they visited the facility. These results suggest that
health facilities are generally open and that the margin of improvement in this domain is almost
nonexistent.
Out of a list of 23 potentially offered health services, the typical health facility offers 14 services24.
23Figure 4 shows that prices for non-targeted services in the PBF group are close to the prices in the fixed payment
group at all parts of the distribution.
24Curative consultations, pre and postnatal visits, birth delivery and preschool consultations are offered by more
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PBF health facilities offer the same number of targeted and non-targeted services as in the fixed
payment group. PBF did thus not induce changes in the extensive margin of service supply.
Staff Composition and Attendance On average, facilities counted 7 workers among which
two-thirds were technical workers (doctors –only 3% of staff – nurses and birth-assistants) and
one third non-technical workers (pharmacists, managers, secretaries, receptionists and maintenance
workers). Contrary to the result of Bandiera et al. (2013) that team incentives change team
composition in for-profit organizations, PBF did not change the quantity of staff nor the type of
workers The finding that staff composition remained stable suggests that worker mobility was low
and that financial incentives were not able to spur health workers into assortative matching by
ability (as observed in the context of Bandiera et al. 2013). Indeed, the number of workers who
left the facility in the last 12 months was found to be equal in both groups (0.76 workers).
However, we find higher staff attendance under PBF than under fixed-payment in the unan-
nounced visits in July, August and September 2012: 58% in the fixed payment group versus 65%
in the PBF group, a 14% increase, significant at the 10% level. Figure 9 shows the distribution
of staff attendance at facilities by treatment status. We see that staff attendance is higher in the
PBF group than in the fixed payment group at any point of the distribution, suggesting that incen-
tivized facilities responded quite similarly to the incentive in terms of staff attendance. The higher
attendance due to PBF echoes workers’ statements in the qualitative interviews: “If we work a lot,
we will have more money and conversely”; “We need to work many days and hours in order to have
more patients”.
Preventive Sessions at Facilities Incentivized workers organized more preventive sessions at
facilities in the last 12 months than non-incentivized workers (120 instead of 100, although the
difference is not significant). The difference is driven by targeted services (immunization, prenatal
care and family planning) for which 74 preventive sessions were offered in the fixed payment group
and 106 in the PBF group (a 43% increase significant at the 5% level). For non-targeted services
(postnatal care and VIH prevention), the number of preventive sessions is also higher in the PBF
group but the difference is not significant25. Figures 5 and 6 show the distributions of the number of
than 90% of health facilities. Immunization is offered by 88% and family planning by 84%. A smaller proportion of
health facilities offer the other services.
25The supply for preventive sessions is already higher for targeted services than for non-targeted services (out of
100 preventive sessions in the last 12 months, 74 were devoted targeted services and 26 to non-targeted ones). PBF
thus widened this gap.
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preventive sessions for targeted and non-targeted services by treatment status: we see a reduction in
the proportion of facilities offering few preventive sessions (less than 80 a year), and an increase in
the proportion of facilities offering many sessions (above 100 a year). As a result, access to targeted
health services is easier in the PBF group since a larger number of preventive sessions gives more
opportunities to use the service. In contrast, access to non-targeted services remained the same in
both groups.
Number of Outreach Activities in the Community The number of outreach activities by
health workers in the community is higher in the PBF group: health workers performed an average
of 22 visits to the community in the last 12 months, versus 15 in the fixed payment group, but this
difference is not significant. In fact, the difference in the number of outreach activities is driven
by targeted services: health workers made 16 visits to communities for these services in the PBF
group, versus 10 in the fixed payment group (a 60% significant increase significant at the 10% level).
In contrast, the difference in the number of outreach activities for non-targeted services is small
and not significant. Figures 7 and 8 show the distributions of the number of outreach activities
for targeted and non-targeted services by treatment status. We see a reduction in the proportion
of health workers offering fewer than 50 visits to community for targeted services. The population
in the catchement area of a PBF facility was thus better informed about the preventive sessions
organized at that facility than the population in the catchement area in a fixed payment facility.
Conclusion on Accessibility of Health Services Overall, access to health services was im-
proved in PBF facilities through a decrease in user fees, an increase in staff attendance, a larger
supply for preventive sessions organized at the facility, and a greater number of visits to the com-
munity.
5.3 Service Quality
Table 3 presents the effects of PBF on service quality: technical quality, patient understanding of
diagnosis and prescriptions, and patient satisfaction. While analyzing the results on quality, it is
important to keep in mind that this PBF approach did not tie payments to any quality measures.
Technical Quality of Health Services On average, patients straight out of consultation re-
ported 16-minute consultations in the fixed payment group and PBF did not impact this con-
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sultation time. Household members who visited in the last 12 months reported a slightly longer
consultation time for their last consultation in the PBF group (19 minutes) than in the fixed pay-
ment group (16 minutes) (the difference is significant at the 1% level). This finding dispels the
fear that incentives based on the quantity of health services would imply maximizing the number
of patients at the expense of time spent with each of them.
The average compliance rates with standard medical procedures were low: 32% for curative
visits, 67% for prenatal visits, and 62% of postnatal visits. Forty-nine percent of patients straight
out of consultation also reported that drugs were prescribed without their being examined. On
average, women stayed 2.3 days in the health facility after giving birth. These measures of technical
quality were not affected by PBF. Our data thus show that technical quality is poor and PBF had
no impact on it.
Users’ Understanding and Satisfaction Users’ understanding of the diagnosis and medication
seems high and also unaffected by PBF: 82% of patients straight out of consultation and 94% of
household members who visited in the last 12 months understood the diagnosis, and 90% of patients
were aware of what drugs they were supposed to take. Users’ satisfaction is also very high (94%
among patients straight out of consultation and 91% among household members who visited in the
last 12 months) and unaffected by PBF. The main reason for being satisfied or dissatisfied of the
visit is care quality (Table 3 reports only reasons related to service quality26).
Conclusion on Service Quality Together, these results suggest that health workers did not
reduce quality in response to the volume-based incentive, nor improved quality to attract more
patients. The reason why service quality is not elastic to incentives might be that quality depends
on worker background, education and skills that might be difficult to change. It might also reflect
the fact that health workers are not sure how to improve service quality, and/or not sure what aspect
of service quality users observe and value. Low technical quality suggests that there are margins
for improvement in that domain, but it is unclear that health workers can make such improvements
and that users will be able to observe and be responsive to it. This experiment shows that service
quality does not respond to an incentive which is tied to patient volume.
26Other reasons for being satisfied or disatisfied by the visit were: price and distance. They both account for a
very small proportion of satisfactions, and an even smaller proportion of dissatisfaction.
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5.4 Utilization of Health Services
Table 4 presents the effects of PBF on service utilization. We find a small decrease in health service
utilization, in particular for services whose price was reduced.
In the control group, 50% of people visited a health facility in the last 12 months. PBF reduced
this proportion to 45%, a difference which is significant at the 1% level. One reason could be that
people had less reason to visit for illness but data show that the reduction in visits occurred among
people who have been sick in the last 12 months: the proportion of sick people who visited a facility
was reduced from 62% in the fixed payment group to 55% in the PBF group (significant at the 10%
level). This finding is particularly striking given that the price of curative consultation and drugs
was reduced in incentivized facilities. We also find that sick people waited almost three days with
symptoms before they visited and that PBF did not change utilization on this intensive margin.
We do not find any effect of PBF on utilization of immunization. . Eighty-five percent of
children aged 0-5 received at least one immunization shot based on mother declaration and the
enumerators could see the TB immunization scar on the shoulder of 60% of children. When the
immunization card could be seen, the average number of immunization shots was 2.727.
Take-up for prenatal visits was lower in the PBF group. In the fixed payment group, women
who have been pregnant in the last 12 months visited 3.3 times for a prenatal consultation on
average. While this proportion is lower but not significantly different in the PBF group over the
last 12 months, the difference is significant when we focus on the period when PBF was in place:
for women who gave birth before September 2012, the number of prenatal visits is 11% lower in the
PBF group than in the fixed payment group. We don’t find any substitution of modern medicine for
traditional medicine: the same reduction in the number of prenatal visits is found when we include
visits to healers and den mothers28. Despite a reduction in the price of prenatal consultation, we
thus find a clear reduction in take-up of prenatal care due to PBF.
Utilization of attended delivery, postnatal consultation, and family planning were not changed
by PBF. Eighty-two percent of births were attended in a health facility over the last 12 months,
and women visited on average only once for a postnatal consultation. Only 5%of women aged
15-49 were using a modern contraceptive method29 and the fertility rate was very high: 35% of
27Full immunization requires 5 shots, ideally before the child turns 2.
28The negligible increase in the number of visits when we include healers and den mothers suggest a small utilization
of traditional medicine for prenatal care.
29Modern contraceptive methods are pill, shot, condom, IUD, spermicidal, implant and sterilization.
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women aged 15-49 had been pregnant in the last 12 months (here we consider only women from
the representative sample since all women in the other sample have been pregnant in the last 12
months by construction).
Finally, women who gave birth before September 2012, during the pilot, were more likely to
have a c-section. The effect size is large: while 1.1% of women had a c-section in the fixed payment
group, 4% of women had a c-section in the PBF group. This result suggests that doctors performed
strategically more c-sections in response to the incentive, which should be related to the fact that
c-section brings a huge amount of points in this particular PBF system (see Appendix Table 1). The
consequence in terms of public health is not clear since c-sections should be used to avoid difficult
deliveries, although it might also be unjustified and cause negative outcomes for the mother and
the child. Health outcomes are covered in the next section.
Conclusion on Utilization of Health Services Overall, we find that PBF decreased utilization
of curative and prenatal services, and did not change utilization of other services. This result is
surprising given the effort made by health workers to improve the accessibility of targeted services,
and the price reduction of curative and prenatal services. Our data show that the average health
worker spent 10 hours in the facility the day before the survey, and consulted six patients spending
16 minutes with each. That means much idle time during the day. The important result is that
the incentivized health workers could not identify and address the barriers to health service uptake,
which might be particularly severe in developing regions like Haut-Katanga. Classic and sensible
strategies to improve service uptake proved counterproductive. Positive price-elasticity of demand
for health suggests that prices of health services work as signals for the value of health services, and
that people might be reluctant to use health services when they do not fully understand its benefits.
Preventive sessions and outreach activities would help only if demand is discouraged by uncertainty
about service availability. But in the context of Haut-Katanga, it seems that more than eased
access is needed. The price signal of quality suggests that the population needs information about
the benefits of health services. In contrast, Dupas (2014) shows that lower prices of bednets lead
to higher adoption. However, households who were offered a subsidy to acquiere a bednet in this
experiment were informed about the market value of the bednet, which was printed on the voucher.
It means that households knew both the value of the bednet and the price reduction associated with
the subsidy. Prices thus did not work as a signal for quality. Our findings add to this literature
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by showing that prices work as signal for quality when the population is poor, low-educated and
generally uninformed about modern medicine, suggesting that price reduction should be combined
with information on the value of health products.
5.5 Population Health Status
Table 5 presents the effect of PBF on health outcomes. We find a deterioration in newborn and child
health: height-for-age and weight-for-age z-scores were found to be lower in the in the catchment
area of a PBF facility than in the catchment area of a fixed payment facility, as well as the proportion
of children born in the last 12 months that were still alive. The effect size is substantial: the means
of weight-for-age and height-for-age in the PBF group are 0.18 standard deviations below the mean
in the fixed payment group, and the proportion of newborns who did not survive in the catchment
area of a PBF facility is twice as big as in the in the catchment area of a fixed payment facility.
The estimates are less precise when we focus on children born before September 2012, when PBF
was in place, but the point estimates are of similar magnitudes. We don’t find that PBF affected
the overall mortality rate in the households, nor mortality of women who gave birth in the last
12 months and children aged 0-5. The negative impact of PBF on mortality thus concentrated on
children born in the last 12 months. The negative effects on newborn mortality and child weight
and height might be related to the negative impact PBF on prenatal care utilization.
5.6 Health Facility Revenue
Table 6 presents the effects of PBF on facility resources, worker’s payment, and the overall quality
of facility infrastructure and equipment.
Total Resources at the Facility Level We find 45% less total resources in the hands of PBF
health facilities than fixed payment health facilities the month before the survey (the difference
is significant at the 5% level). The reduction in facility resources comes from a 56% reduction in
revenue from users (significant at the 10% level). In contrast, we don’t observe any difference in
revenue from the government or NGOs. This result is consistent with our previous findings that
PBF led to lower user fees and price of drugs, and lower service utilization, than fixed payments.
According to the qualitative interviews, incentivized health workers who reduced their fees to in-
crease demand found themselves in a situation where they were not able to re-adjust their price
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schedule and raise prices back to their initial values as the population had become accustomed to
the reduced prices and they were fearful of reducing demand to even lower levels.
Workers’ Payment As a consequence, salary to health workers was significantly lower in PBF
health facilities than in fixed payment ones. We find a 35% reduction in workers’ total payment
in the last month as reported by the facility head, and a 28% decrease as reported by the health
workers (significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively). Wages from the government are not
lower in the PBF and the fixed payment group, but payment from the facility itself is lower. This
result is consistent with the reduced user fees and drug prices observed in the PBF health facilities’
revenue.
Quality of the Facility Infrastructure and Equipment We find a significant negative impact
of PBF on the quantity and quality of equipment and infrastructure. The mean quality index in
the PBF group is 0.35 standard deviations below the mean in the fixed payment group. Most of
the twelve items included in this index indicate a lower quality of equipment in the PBF facilities
- negative differences are significant for four items: sink, clean towels, sterilization material and
the availability of an examination table30. Furthermore, the mean equipment index in the PBF
group is 0.29 standard deviations below the mean in the fixed payment group. The components
of this index show that PBF facilities have consistently less equipment than the comparison ones.
The differences are significant for four medical equipments: microscope, gynecological examination
table, fridge and fuel. The day of the survey, the enumerator also checked the availability of five
common vaccines31 and nine common drugs32. We find less-than perfect –although not so bad-
availability of these products: four out of five vaccines and seven out of nine drugs were available
in the health facility the day of the survey. The PBF had a negative impact on the availability of
vaccines the day of the survey, with fewer than 3.5 out of five vaccines available in the PBF group,
but no impact on the availability of drugs, nor on the infrastructure index. The negative effects
of PBF on the quality index, the equipment index and the availability of vaccines are likely to be
related to the reduced revenue in the PBF group. Because of the lack of resources, PBF health
facilities had difficulties in investing in new equipment and repairing existing equipment.
30However, it is worth noting that PBF facilities are more likely to permanently display the user fees and drugs’
costs in the facility.
31Vaccines: DTP, Poliomyelitis, BCG, Measles and Yellow Fever.
32Drugs: oral rehydration salts, paracetamol, co-trimoxazole, ampicillin, metronidazole, quinine sulfate, mebenda-
zole, tetracycline and Ringer’s solution.
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Conclusion on Health Facility Revenue Overall, PBF had a significant and substantial nega-
tive impact on health facilities’ resources, health workers salaries and health facilities’ infrastructure
and equipment.
5.7 Staff Well-Being and Motivation
5.7.1 Staff Well-Being
Table 7 presents the effect of PBF on staff well-being, measured by staff satisfaction, conflicts, stress,
and anxiety. All these outcomes are based on self-reported information so it is clearly subjective.
Since we do not see any reason why social desirability bias would be different in the PBF and in the
fixed payment group, the comparison between the two groups gives evidence on how PBF affected
staff subjective well-being.
Job Satisfaction PBF induced a 14% significant decrease in the job satisfaction of facility staff
– going from 5.7 to 4.9 on a scale from 0 to 10. In the qualitative interviews, many health workers
from the PBF group complained about the PBF system and the frustration they had from the
inefficiency of their strong efforts to increase the demand: “If there is no patient, we can’t do more
than working 26 days”. The lower job satisfaction is also plausibly related to the unsuccessful effort
and reduced worker salary.
Conflicts, Stress and Anxiety Overall, more than half of the facility staff found their workload
heavy (53%), felt that they had too much work last week (61%) and that they have been tired
(56%) in the last seven days. The PBF decreased significantly the perceived workload and fatigue:
these three indicators decreased by respectively 11%, 28% and 16% (these last two decreases being
significant at the 5 and 10% level). As shown in the previous section, the effective workload was
actually reduced in the PBF group. The change in perception could also be due to the disappointing
impact of the effort facility staff made to increase the number of patients: the increased effort to
attract patients made the lack of demand for health services more salient, which could also have
contributed to the lower subjective workload. Overall, the mean Subjective Workload index in the
PBF group is 0.19 standard deviations below the mean in the fixed payment group.
As PBF led to lower and more uncertain payments than fixed payments, we tested if it caused
more stress for the workers. In the fixed payment group, 34% of the workers declared that they worry
about the volatility of their remuneration, and PBF did not significantly affect this proportion.
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Importantly, workers worried about the level of their remuneration as much in the PBF group as
in the fixed payment group (41%). It is surprising that the reduction in worker payment did not
translate to an increase in the proportion of workers who were worried about the level of their
remuneration.
As for conflicts, PBF did not change workers’ perception of competition between facilities, nor
the level of conflicts within facilities.Thirty-six percent of facility staff reported that the facility was
in competition with other health facilities in both the fixed payment group and the PBF group.
Workers reported a low level of conflict within the facility (1.72 on a scale from 0 to 10), with again
no impact of PBF. Only 8% of workers reported that the allocation of government payment was a
source of conflict in the facility in the fixed payment group, and 12% in the PBF group, a difference
which is not statistically significant.
Overall we observe a lower perceived workload and a lower satisfaction in the PBF group, both
likely due to the disappointing impact of increased effort on the number of patients and worker
salary. However, PBF did not create more stress, anxiety or conflicts in the facilities.
5.7.2 Staff Motivation
Table 7 also presents the effect of PBF on staff motivation, as measured by free-riding, attendance
after incentives were withdrawn and importance attached to job remuneration. As shown in Table 2,
workers’ effort to attract patients is larger under performance-based payment than fixed-payment,
which we interpret as an increase in worker motivation due the incentive. In this section, we look
more precisely at the effect of PBF on the nature of motivation.
Free-riding We don’t find evidence that the collective nature of the incentive led to free-riding.
First, the proportion of agents who did not do any outreach activities remained equal in both
groups (48%). Second, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the number of outreach activities
among agents who did some activities all increased due to PBF, which means that effort increased
all over the counterfactual distribution. Finally, the standard deviation of the number of outreach
activities per agent at the facility level is larger in the PBF group, but not statistically different.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of PBF on worker effort is a pure upward translation
for all workers. Altogether, these findings suggest that workers did not free-ride on others’ effort.
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Staff Attendance After the Incentives were Removed The positive effect of the incentive
on staff attendance when incentives were in place reversed after incentives were withdrawn. The
interviewers did not announce the day they would arrive in the facility for the endline survey to
avoid manipulation of staff attendance. The attendance rate in the fixed payment group was 57%,
similar to before the payment was withdrawn. This finding suggests that the termination of fixed
payments did not affect staff effort, leaving intrinsic motivation intact. In contrast, a striking
reversal happened in the PBF group: the attendance rate was at 65% before the incentive was
withdrawn while only 45% after. This represents a substantial and statistically significant (at the
5% level) difference in the number of workers observed by the interviewer when s/he arrived: 3.8
in the comparison group while only 2.5 in the PBF group. Figure 10 shows the distribution of
staff attendance at facilities after the pilot by treatment status. Staff attendance is lower in the
PBF group than in the fixed payment group at any point of the distribution, suggesting again that
workers responded quite similarly to the termination of the incentive33.
The financial incentive thus induced higher worker motivation compared to fixed payments
as long as the incentives were in place, but lower motivation after the incentive was withdrawn.
It is important to keep in mind that payments from the government stopped in both the PBF
and the fixed payment groups at the same time, which represents the same average reduction in
health facilities’ revenue by design. The reversal in staff attendance difference between PBF and
fixed payment facilities thus happened in a context where facilities’ revenue decreased by the same
amount. In addition, the lower staff attendance after the incentives were withdrawn is unlikely to
be due to the lower worker salary induced by PBF: salaries were already lower before the incentives
stopped34, whereas staff attendance was found higher at that time. Therefore, the reason for the
reversal is likely to be driven by a change in levels of worker intrinsic motivation.
Attention Paid to Material Benefits In the fixed payment group, 38% of workers mention
spontaneously remuneration or material comfort as the main advantage or disadvantage of their
position, as opposed to non material benefits (like social recognition or health benefits to the
population). This proportion increases dramatically to 51% in the PBF group (a 34% increase
significant at the 5% level). This finding suggests that exposure to PBF changed the salience of
financial motives in health workers’ mind. Importantly, this change is also unlikely to be driven by
33This result is consistent with declarative data from the workers: worker attendance rate in the last seven days
is found 78% in the fixed payment group while 71% in the PBF group (p-value of the test of equality 0.04).
34Tables 1 and 4 show that prices and utilization went down before the end of the pilot.
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the decrease in worker salary since we observe an increase from 11% to 17% (significant at the 10%
level) in the proportion of workers who mention financial benefits as the main advantage, while a
smaller and insignificant increase in the proportion of workers who mention financial benefits as
the main disadvantage (from 29% to 35%, p-value 0.15). This finding gives evidence of a shift in
attention from the intrinsic value that the worker attributes to her job to its material benefits. We
interpret this effect as evidence that incentives change the locus of control from internal to external
by increasing the weight of external motives relative to intrinsic motives in worker utility.
Conclusions on Staff Motivation To summarize the effects of PBF on worker motivation, we
find that: 1) When PBF is in place, worker’s motivation was higher under PBF (U0 < U1) despite
the fact that worker salaries from user fees were lower than under fixed payments (F1 < F0); 2) After
PBF is withdrawn, worker motivation is lower in the group that was exposed to PBF (U2 < U0);
and 3) Attention paid to financial motives relative to intrinsic motives is larger among workers who
have been exposed to incentives (α0 < α1). Together, these effects give evidence that incentives
reduce worker intrinsic motivation.
6 Conclusion
This study compares a performance-based payment mechanism to a fixed payment mechanism for
health care providers in the district of Haut-Katanga, DRC. The performance-based payment stud-
ied was conditional on the number of patients for some pre-determined services, which is one specific
approach of PBF. The findings show that the performance-based mechanism led to more effort by
health workers to attract patients for the services included in the performance measure, without
crowding out non-targeted services and service quality, nor generating conflicts, score manipula-
tion or free-riding within the facilities. However, the increased effort from the health workers was
associated with a smaller utilization of health services by the population, leading to a very disap-
pointing reduction in facility revenue and worker income, as well as to a deterioration in newborn
and child health outcomes. These findings suggest that existing health workers cannot be treated
as entrepreneurs as they were not able to identify the successful strategies to increase demand for
health services35. Importantly, we also find that PBF created a shift in workers’ attention from
35New health workers informed about the payment system who would have self-selected in the health sector might
be more able to develop appropriate strategies, as suggested by the results of Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee (2014) on
the effects of carreer incentives on selection in the public health sector.
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non-financial to financial motives apart from the reduction in worker income, and that workers
decreased their effort after the removal of the incentives below its non-incentivized level.
In terms of policy lessons, these findings suggest that financial incentives should be used as
a permanent policy rather than a temporary policy in order to limit the adverse effects of the
motivational shift, and only in situations where the task is easy so that workers have the capacity
to carry out the rewarded output, which might be a challenge in non-profit sectors where users’
rationality is non standard. Indeed, the lack of response of the population challenges the idea that
the demand for health services is normal: substantial decreases in prices deterred demand for health
services, and improved accessibility was not able to encourage more demand. Specific interventions
to stimulate demand for health may be combined with supply-side interventions like PBF. One
possibility would be thus to include service quality in the set of purchased performances as it was
done in Rwanda (Basinga et al. 2011), with the hope that health providers would have the capacity
to make quality improvements that would be observed by the population and would attract more
patients. Alternatively, interventions to improve awareness about the benefits of health products or
to help people overcome behavioral issues like procrastination could supplement a PBF mechanism.
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Table 1: Effects on User Fees






Mean of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
User fees as reported by facility heads at endline
Fee Summary Index Health Facility 93 -1.077 0.141 .166473 4.212105
Fee Summary Index, targeted services Health Facility 109 -.807 0.061* .0366889 2.866472
Fee Summary Index, non-targeted services Health Facility 95 -.398 0.346 .1007338 2.064238
Targeted Services
User fee for the first curative consultation (FC) Health Facility 123 -692.45 0.281 1263.492 4557.316
User fee for delivery (FC) Health Facility 113 -224.185 0.655 2747.414 2423.25
User fee for the first prenatal visit (FC) Health Facility 118 -407.873 0.095* 850 1741.42
User fee for the second prenatal visit (FC) Health Facility 115 -80.801 0.053* 132.2034 264.8622
Non-Targeted Services
User fee for the second curative consultation (FC) Health Facility 112 -178.082 0.18 459.4828 799.0377
User fee for postnatal visit (FC) Health Facility 111 -57.43 0.386 105.3571 430.8215
User fee for preschool consultation (FC) Health Facility 112 -6.718 0.838 86.66666 154.8281
User fees as reported by users in the last 12 months
Fee the last postnatal visit (if any in the last 12 months) (FC) Mother 388 -40.458 0.544 349.2684 585.9773
Fee for attended delivery (if any in the last 12 months) (FC) Mother 762 -234.426 0.732 8768.171 6910.282
Fee the last prenatal visit (if any in the last 12 months) (FC) Pregnant Women 918 -120.798 0.028** 583.4368 721.459
Fee the last immunization visit (if any in the last 12 months) (FC) Children 0-5 2039 -22.096 0.237 87.71028 316.9161
Fee for the present curative visit (if the reason for visit was illness) (FC) Patient 718 -1897.282 0.034** 7311.323 16030.53
Cost of drugs at the facility for the present curative visit (if the reason for visit was illness) (FC) Patient 549 -1581.249 0.002*** 3628.322 6160.657
User fees as reported by users before September 2012
Fee the last postnatal visit (if any before September 2012) (FC) Mother 227 -32.896 0.637 315.7232 539.3551
Fee for attended delivery (if any before September 2012) (FC) Mother 493 463.057 0.546 8726.834 6926.556
Fee the last prenatal visit (if any before September 2012) (FC) Pregnant Women 581 -187.611 0.001*** 598.0456 706.0172
Fee the last immunization visit (if any before September 2012) (FC) Children 0-5 508 18.014 0.489 73.16177 211.3834
Targeted services are: first curative consultation, delivery, and prenatal visits.
Fee Summary Index is the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the 
control group standard deviation. The components of the index are fees paid for first and second curative consultations, delivery, prenatal and postnatal visits, and preschool consultation. 
Non-targeted services are: second curative consultation, postnatal visit, and preschool consultation.
Unit of Observation: Pregnant Women = Women 15-49 who were pregnant in the last 12 months ; Mother = Women who gave birth in the last 12 months.
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the unit of observation.
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Table 2: Effects on Service Accessibility






Mean of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
Health Facility Opening and Services Offered
Opening
Number of opening hours per week (as reported by the facility head) Health Facility 116 -6.522 0.524 138.9262 47.86586
Number of opening days in the last month (as reported by the facility head) Health Facility 119 -.139 0.816 29.73016 1.885482
The patient could consult each time s/he visited Patient 993 -.019 0.322 .9375 .2422843
The household member  could consult each time s/he visited Household Member 4323 .016 0.351 .857081 .3500661
Services Offered at the Facility
Number of services offered by the facility (between 0 and 23) Health Facility 123 -.492 0.35 13.55556 3.644606
Number of targeted services offered by the facility (between 0 and 10) Health Facility 123 -.141 0.606 7.730159 1.715267
Number of non-targeted health services offered by the facility (between 0 and 13) Health Facility 123 -.351 0.329 5.825397 2.393133
Staff Composition and Effort
Number of workers in the facility Health Facility 121 -.772 0.215 6.725806 5.128415
% health workers in the facility Health Facility 123 .027 0.425 .683401 .1826084
% doctors in the facility Health Facility 123 -.001 0.933 .0271569 .0575394
Number of workers who left the facility in the last 12 months Health Facility 123 -.009 0.972 .7619048 1.011455
Av. % workers present in the facility on unannounced visits 1, 2 and 3 Health Facility 138 .074 0.067* .5807223 .2924829
Preventive Sessions Organized at the Facility in the Last 12 Months 
Number of preventive sessions at facility provided in the last 12 months Health Facility 118 20.084 0.291 100.4426 82.87933
Number of preventive sessions at facility for targeted services provided in the last 12 months Health Facility 119 31.542 0.044** 73.91803 57.09679
Number of preventive sessions at facility for non-targeted services provided in the last 12 months Health Facility 120 10.808 0.107 26.87097 31.89197
Outreach Activities by Health Workers in the Last 12 Months 
Number of outreach activities in the last 12 months Health Worker 326 7.184 0.171 15.23295 44.47532
Number of outreach activities for targeted services in the last 12 months Health Worker 326 5.976 0.096* 9.829545 26.42281
Number of outreach activities for non-targeted services in the last 12 months Health Worker 326 1.208 0.523 5.403409 19.53698
Preventive sessions include: immunization, prenatal care and family planning (targeted services), postnatal care and HIV prevention (non-targeted services).
Outreach activities include: immunization, prenatal care and family planning (targeted services), postnatal care and HIV prevention (non-targeted services).
Table 2: Effects on Service Accessibility 
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the unit of observation.
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Table 3: Effects on Service Quality




p-value (ATE=0) Mean of Dep. Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
Technical Quality
Consultation time (minutes) Patient 974 1.028 0.422 16.09263 15.51822
If visited a health facility, consultation time (minutes) Household Member 4265 2.506 0*** 16.125 11.96238
If visited for illness, compliance rate with medical procedure for the present curative consultation Patient 713 -.008 0.805 .3239075 .2992397
If visited for illness, drugs were prescribed to the patient and the patient was not examined Patient 719 -.036 0.495 .4936387 .5005968
If delivery attended, number of days in the health facility after the delivery Mother 767 -.077 0.689 2.313283 1.702673
If any postnatal visit, compliance rate with medical procedures for the last postnatal consultation Mother 389 .048 0.123 .6166667 .258334
If any prenatal visit, compliance rate with medical procedures for the last prenatal consultation Pregnant Women 923 .004 0.818 .6657578 .1680248
Users' Understanding
If visited for illness, patient understands diagnosis and next steps Patient 720 -.001 0.971 .822335 .3827164
If visited for illness, patient knows what drugs to be taken Patient 718 -.046 0.187 .8982188 .3027457
If visited a facility, household member understands diagnosis Household Member 4258 .017 0.241 .9372237 .2426138
Users' Satisfaction
The Patient reports that s/he was…
satisfied Patient 994 .013 0.359 .9430147 .2320279
satisfied thanks to care quality Patient 990 .003 0.937 .5722222 .4952152
satisfied thanks to welcome quality Patient 990 -.027 0.442 .2796296 .4492334
satisfied thanks to equipment quality Patient 990 0 0.997 .0333333 .1796719
dissatisfied because of care quality Patient 993 -.005 0.671 .0349265 .1837626
dissatisfied because of welcome quality Patient 993 0 0.946 .0073529 .0855121
dissatisfied because of equipment quality Patient 993 -.006 0.359 .0110294 .1045364
If visited a health facility, the Household Member reports that s/he was…
satisfied Household Member 4326 .004 0.778 .9142857 .2800023
satisfied thanks to care quality Household Member 4318 -.005 0.857 .7417678 .4377572
satisfied thanks to welcome quality Household Member 4318 -.008 0.547 .0836222 .2768804
satisfied thanks to equipment quality Household Member 4318 .001 0.855 .0186308 .1352467
dissatisfied because of care quality Household Member 4312 -.002 0.853 .0487593 .2154112
dissatisfied because of welcome quality Household Member 4312 -.001 0.844 .0104484 .1017042
dissatisfied because of equipment quality Household Member 4312 .001 0.76 .008707 .0929245
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.y p p g p g g
months.
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Table 4: Effects on Service Utilization




p-value (ATE=0) Mean of Dep. Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
Overall Utilization
The household member visited a health facility in the last 12 months Household Member 9113 -.051 0.006*** .4961274 .5000388
Curative Services
If was sick in the last 12 months, the individual visited a health facility in the last 12 months Household Member 5926 -.043 0.074* .6225681 .4848229
If was sick and visited in the last 12 months, number of days before s/he visited a health facility Household Member 3477 .014 0.916 2.70134 2.8628
Child Immunization 
Ever had an immunization shot Children 0-5 2448 -.002 0.94 .8486739 .3585063
Has a scar from tuberculosis immunization Children 0-5 2441 .016 0.677 .6 .4900902
If the immunization card seen by the interviewer, number of immunization shots Children 0-5 833 -.023 0.961 2.706977 3.186173
If aged 15 months or older , ever had an immunization shot Children 0-5 1415 .016 0.359 .9282759 .2582087
If aged 15 months or older , has a scar from tuberculosis immunization Children 0-5 1411 .041 0.322 .6546463 .4758135
Prenatal Services
Number of prenatal visits at a health facility Pregnant Women 1120 -.281 0.14 3.357782 2.122774
Number of prenatal visits, including healers and den mothers Pregnant Women 1117 -.292 0.13 3.482944 2.243731
If gave birth before Sept. 2012 , number of prenatal visits at a health facility Pregnant Women 603 -.373 0.054* 3.467105 1.751634
If gave birth before Sept. 2012 , number of prenatal visits including healers and den mothers Pregnant Women 607 -.422 0.044** 3.674267 1.919479
Delivery
The mother delivered in a health facility Mother 961 -.015 0.684 .8241309 .3810987
If delivery attended, had a C-section Mother 773 .018 0.121 .0173697 .130807
If gave birth before Sept. 2012 , delivered at a health facility Mother 624 -.021 0.623 .8285714 .3774827
If gave birth before Sept. 2012 and delivery attended, had a c-section Mother 500 .029 0.071* .0114943 .1067981
Postnatal Services
Number of postnatal visits at a health facility Mother 959 .055 0.622 .8650306 1.426543
Number of postnatal visits, including healers and den mothers Mother 957 .058 0.655 1.10041 1.778309
If gave birth before Aug. 2012 , number of postnatal visits at a health facility Mother 528 -.059 0.647 .8769231 1.282585
If gave birth before Aug. 2012 , number of postnatal visits, including healers and den mothers Mother 523 .011 0.943 1.011719 1.387571
Family Planning
Uses a modern contraceptive method Women 15-49 1873 .005 0.69 .0505263 .2191437
Has been pregnant in the last 12 months (representative sample only) Women 15-49 902 -.005 0.882 .3522976 .4782096
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
Unit of Observation: Pregnant Women = Women 15-49 who were pregnant in the last 12 months ; Mother = Women who gave birth in the last 12 months.
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Table 5: Effects on Health Outcomes




p-value (ATE=0) Mean of Dep. Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
Newborn and Child Health
Weight-for-age z-score Children 0-5 2428 -.181 0.048** -1.061262 1.741033
Height-for-age z-score Children 0-5 2402 -.184 0.044** -1.654884 1.864021
If gave birth in the last 12 months, her child is still alive Mother 961 -.01 0.093* .9897751 .1007032
If born before September 2012 , weight-for-age z-score Children 0-5 2109 -.126 0.184 -1.305793 1.577741
If born before September 2012 , height-for-age z-score Children 0-5 2087 -.177 0.073* -1.842894 1.782993
If gave birth before Sept. 2012 , her child is still alive Mother 624 -.012 0.203 .9936508 .0795549
Mortality
Number of persons in the household who died in the last 12 months Household 1708 .007 0.732 .1366313 .4006933
Number of women in the household who died for perinatal reasons in the last 12 months Household 1707 -.004 0.427 .009434 .0967264
Number of children under 5 in the household who died in the last 12 month Household 1707 .012 0.55 .0896226 .3171387
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
Unit of Observation: Mother = Women who gave birth in the last 12 months.
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Table 6: Effects on Facility Total Resources






Mean of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
Total Resources at the Facility Level
Revenue from users Health Facility 116 -258312.7 0.051* 463328.7 945376.8
Revenue from the government Health Facility 121 6917.788 0.903 121674.5 250612.5
Revenue from NGOs and private donors Health Facility 121 -121.757 0.555 435.4839 3429.003
Total revenue Health Facility 116 -290462.7 0.023** 642700.7 1028920
Workers' Payment
Payment to the Workers (reported by the Facility Head)
Average total payment per worker in the last month (FC) Health Facility 116 -17553.24 0.084* 50679.49 57950.96
Average wage from the government per worker in the last month (FC) Health Facility 118 4660.341 0.083* 1731.591 5442.607
Average payment from the facility per worker in the last month (FC) Health Facility 119 -12444.67 0.154 42580.55 47536.47
Payment to the Health Workers (reported by the Health Workers)
Total payment in the last month (FC) Health Worker 282 -35885.75 0.031** 127139.5 174494.9
Wage received from the government in the last month (FC) Health Worker 326 -4999.407 0.5 23654.04 88004.44
Payment received from the facility in the last month (FC) Health Worker 285 -28682.54 0.061* 102552.8 153866.8
Quality of the Facility Infrastructure and Equipment
Quality index^ based on interviewers' observation (Principal Component Analysis) Health Facility 116 -.525 0.014** .1990995 1.511479
Infrastructure index^^ (Principal Component Analysis) Health Facility 110 .184 0.372 -.1715342 1.425423
Equipment index^^^ (Principal Component Analysis) Health Facility 116 -.639 0.026** .052816 2.226755
Number of types of vaccine currently available (between 0 and 5) Health Facility 118 -.744 0.034** 4.16129 1.738603
Number of types of vaccine that have been unavailable at some point in the last 12 months (between 0 and 5Health Facility 118 .036 0.929 1.52381 1.740014
Number of types of drug currently available (between 0 and 9) Health Facility 117 .236 0.646 6.7 3.185241
Number of types of drug that have been missing once in the last 12 months (between 0 and 9) Health Facility 111 -.276 0.589 5.333333 3.445148
^The quality index includes observation on building quality, waiting room, consultation room, lavabo, soap, clean towels, bathrooms, sterilization material, permanent display of user fees and drugs’ costs, 
use of an examination table and ordinogram.
^^The infrastructure index includes six items: phone ownership, motorized transportation mean ownership, access to clean water, toilet and electricity, and hard roof. 
^^^The equipment index includes the quantity of fifteen types of medical equipment owned by the health facility: generator, sterilizer, tensiometer, stethoscope, baby-scales, weighing scale, height gauge, 
microscope, gynecological examination table, fridge, delivery boxes, fuel, kerosene, bed and solar panel.
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the unit of observation.
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Table 7: Effects on Staff Well-Being and Intrinsic Motivation




p-value (ATE=0) Mean of Dep. Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
Job Satisfaction
Level of satisfaction of the facility staff for his job (from 0 to 10) Facility Staff 455 -.681 0.038** 5.705394 2.783944
Conflicts, Stress and Anxiety 
Facility staff founds his workload heavy in the last 7 days Facility Staff 454 -.062 0.186 .5291666 .5001917
Facility staff reports too much work in the last 7 days Facility Staff 444 -.128 0.014** .6092437 .4889482
Facility staff felt tired due to the job in the last 7 days Facility Staff 445 -.088 0.096* .5606695 .4973471
Subjective Workload Index Facility Staff 446 -.193 0.019** -.0001799 .7782683
Facility staff worries about insecure / volatile remuneration Facility Staff 451 .029 0.64 .3430962 .4757396
Facility staff worries about low remuneration Facility Staff 451 -.013 0.815 .4142259 .4936216
Facility staff reports that the facility is in competition with other facilities Facility Staff 454 -.06 0.292 .3583333 .4805129
Facility staff reports that payment allocation is a source of conflict in the facility Facility Staff 453 .044 0.19 .0829876 .2764375
Level of conflicts among workers as perceived by facility staff (from 0 to 10) Facility Staff 453 -.284 0.26 1.717842 2.203041
Free-riding
% agents who did not do any outreach activity for targeted services in the last 12 months Health Worker 326 -.004 0.947 0.482954 0.501135
Among agents who did some outreach activities for targeted services, 25th percentile Health Worker 172 3 0.006*** 2 na
Among agents who did some outreach activities for targeted services, 50th percentile Health Worker 172 6 0.092* 6 na
Among agents who did some outreach activities for targeted services, 75th percentile Health Worker 172 9 0.077* 24 na
Facility level stand. dev. of the number of outreach activities for targeted services per agent (if more than 1 agent) Health Facility 87 9.083 0.136 14.74143 21.81978
Importance Attached to Job Remuneration
Facility staff elicits financial benefits as the main advantage or disadvantage of his position Facility Staff 454 .117 0.025** .3833333 .4872145
Facility staff elicits financial benefits as the main advantage of his job Facility Staff 452 .065 0.075* .1087866 .3120247
Facility staff elicits financial benefits as the main disadvantage of his job Facility Staff 454 .063 0.155 .2916667 .4554796
Staff Effort (Attendance) after PBF was withdrawn
Number of workers in the facility on unnanounced visit 4 (enline survey) Health Facility 123 -1.354 0.032** 3.84127 3.418198
% workers present in the facility on unannounced visit 4 (endline survey) Health Facility 123 -.121 0.099* .5741979 .3109018
Av. attendance rate of workers in the facility in the last 7 days (as reported by the facility head) Health Facility 123 -.09 0.155 .7752835 .1929815
Attendance rate in the facility in the last 7 days (as reported by the Health Worker) Health Worker 331 -.067 0.042** .7799358 .1429585
Unit of Observation: Facility Staff = health workers + facility head
Subjective Workload Index is the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. 
The components of the index are dummies for facility staff founds his workload heavy, facility staff reports too much work in the last 7 days, and facility staff felt tired in the last 7 days.
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
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Appendix Table 1: Relative Prices of Targeted Health Services




Services targeted at health centers and referral health centers  
Curative care Per new curative consultation  $0.6 
Institutional delivery Per delivery at the health center $5 
Obstetric referral Per pregnant woman referred to the referral 
center/hospital 
$5 
Full childhood immunization Per fully immunized child $3.5 
Prenatal care Per prenatal care consultation $1.2 
Tetanus toxoid vaccination Per 5th dose of tetanus toxoid vaccination $2 




Additional services targeted only at referral health centers: 
Caesarean section Per caesarean section delivery (and decision-tree has 
been followed) 
$30 
Blood transfusion, when 
appropriate 
Per transfusion episode $5 




Appendix Table 2: Endline Sample
Endline Sample, by Payment Status 
 PBF Group Comparison Group Total 
Health areas 44 43 87 
Health Facilities 60 63 123 
Facility Staff 154 178 332 
Patients 470 544 1,014 
Households 859 849 1,708 
     Household members 4,578 4,656 9,234 
          Women 15-49 939 957 1,896 
     Pregnant Women* 571 560 1,131 
          Mothers** 479 489 968 
          Children 0-5 1,228 1,285 2,513 
 *Pregnant Women = Women who have been pregnant in the last 12 months 
 **Mothers = Women who gave birth in the last 12 months 
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Appendix Table 3: Descriptive Statistics at Endline 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Nb. of 
Observations 
A. HEALTH FACILITY     
The facility is a "Centre de Santé de Référence" 0.11 0.31 123 
The facility is a "Centre de Santé"  0.69 0.46 123 
The facility is a "Poste de Santé"  0.20 0.40 123 
The facility is public 0.66 0.48 123 
The facility is religious 0.15 0.36 123 
The facility is private 0.19 0.39 123 
The facility is urban or semi-urban 0.17 0.38 123 
The facility is rural 0.83 0.38 123 
Served population size  12872.76 11570.57 123 
    B. HEALTH WORKERS    
The health worker is a female 0.57 0.50 332 
Age of the health worker (years) 42.14 11.20 332 
The health worker is a doctor  0.06 0.23 332 
The health worker is a nurse  0.57 0.50 332 
Number of years of experience 12.56 10.13 331 
    C. PATIENT    
The patient is a female 0.67 0.47 1006 
Age of the patient (years) 18.61 17.39 1002 
    
D. HOUSEHOLDS    
The household member is a female 0.50 0.50 9225 
Age of the household member (years) 17.17 16.13 9135 
The household member is literate (if aged 15 or more) 0.57 0.49 4166 
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Appendix Table 4: Balance Checks
Unit of Observation Number of Observations













Health Center (versus Health Post) Health Facility 129 .78125 .4166667 -.038 0.623
Public Health Facility 129 .59375 .4950148 -.029 0.734
Private Health Facility 129 .28125 .4531635 -.086 0.276
Religious Health Facility 129 .125 .3333333 .115 0.119
Number of years of activity Health Facility 122 20.18333 22.42539 .266 0.948
Catchement population Health Facility 122 11129.3 15802.48 1255.156 0.669
Catchement area (km2) Health Facility 109 368.963 826.58 -19.957 0.892
Number of beds Health Facility 129 8.953125 13.43229 1.23 0.536
Number of workers Health Facility 129 6.359375 5.524454 -.162 0.866
Infrastructure Index^ Health Facility 129 1.00e-08 .5614322 .057 0.525
Equipment Index^ Health Facility 128 -.0031828 .524324 .116 0.352
Medical Material Index^ Health Facility 129 -5.01e-09 .4828278 -.164 0.147
Stock of Vaccines Index^ Health Facility 125 -7.71e-10 .8745002 -.17 0.144
Health Workers
Female Health Worker 457 .4810127 .5006968 -.101 0.042**
Age (years) Health Worker 456 40.31224 10.94959 -.101 0.932
Doctor Health Worker 457 .0421941 .2014572 .016 0.29
Qualified Nurse Health Worker 457 .2362869 .4256995 -.013 0.708
Non-qualified Nurse Health Worker 457 .3122363 .4643864 -.011 0.801
Midwife Health Worker 457 .1561181 .3637355 .006 0.849
Adjunct Health Worker 457 .1687764 .375347 .003 0.952
No education Health Worker 457 .0759494 .2654777 -.014 0.747
Primary Education Health Worker 457 .0801688 .272129 -.016 0.612
Secondary Education Health Worker 457 .3122363 .4643864 .061 0.262
Higher Education Health Worker 457 .2278481 .4203318 .012 0.822
Experience (years) Health Worker 455 10.64255 10.16824 -1.489 0.137
Income (Francs Congolais) Health Worker 304 69508.57 69909.81 2084.831 0.837
Satisfied in the current position Health Worker 457 .4767933 .5005182 .057 0.262
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Appendix Table 4 (continued): Balance Checks
Unit of Observation Number of Observations













Muslim Household 1059 .0288462 .1675352 .001 0.931
Christian Household 1059 .9076923 .2897385 -.039 0.065*
Animist Household 1059 .0192308 .1374674 .005 0.668
Housing Index^ Household 1059 -.0003307 .6473751 -.076 0.349
Female Household Member 6816 .4944524 .5000404 -.005 0.593
Maried Adult 15+ 3845 .5153217 .4998929 .032 0.154
Single person Adult 15+ 3845 .4147089 .4927976 -.017 0.445
Attended some school Adult 15+ 5431 .7348323 .4415013 -.033 0.266
Completed primary school Adult 15+ 2091 .4817245 .4999002 -.031 0.349
If was ever pregnant, visited a health facility during the last pregnancy Pregnant Women 1017 .7447217 .4364366 -.015 0.691
If ever had a child, the last delivery was attended Mother 862 .7112676 .4537061 -.046 0.379
If ever had a child, visited a health facility after the last delivery Mother 846 .2805755 .4498201 .011 0.785
If ever had a child, the last child is still alive Mother 859 .9270588 .2603464 -.005 0.777
Age in months Children 0-10 2654 57.73658 36.12342 -.756 0.537
Immunization card seen by the interviewer Children 0-5 1351 .122093 .3276314 .02 0.409
If immunization card seen, had BCG Children 0-5 177 .797619 .4041878 -.034 0.653
If immunization card seen, had Polio Children 0-5 172 .5432099 .501233 .017 0.859
If immunization card seen, had DTC Children 0-5 177 .7261904 .4485906 .08 0.348
If immunization card seen, had Measles Children 0-5 175 .4938272 .503077 -.015 0.878
If immunization card seen, had Vitamins Children 0-5 178 .2738095 .4485906 -.05 0.489
number of BCG vaccines, DTC vaccines, Polio vaccines, measles vaccines and anti-amariale vaccines in the facility. The Housing Index components are dummies for 
whether the household housing has a water tap, sanitation, garbage collection, and some energy (fuel or electricity). 
Data Source: Baseline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
^Each Summary Index is the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control
group standard deviation. The components of the Infrastructure Index are dummies of whether the health facility has a water tap, electricity, a waste disposal, a sewage disposal, and 
a pharmacy. The components of the Equipment Index are dummies for whether the health facility has a phone, a radio, the number of electricity generators, the number of 
examination tables, the number of refrigerators, the number of fuel liters, and the number of kerosene liters. The components for the Medical Material Index are dummies 
for whether the health facility has autoclaves, tensiometers, sthetoscopes, scales, gauges, microscope, and a delivery kit. The Stock of Vaccines Index components are the 
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